Implementation & International Monitoring on the Example of Ozone
1/5 According to Haas, what is the role of the scientific (epistemic) community in the ozone depletion debate? [There are hints of the same in the declared focus on a common scientific understanding under the European Convention.] If they are so important for ozone, why have folks in white lab coats to date not similarly carried the global climate change debate?
2/5 What is the role of industry in such a debate, and what changed industry’s mind since the chemical industry was originally about as pro ozone depletion treaty as the oil companies are typically pro-climate change restrictions?
3/5 Is an atmospheric treaty really enforceable, and if so on what model? What is the public health issue that recommends freon, etc. continue to be used, and is it justified? What does it mean to segregate usage by country stage of development, and is the smuggling market inevitable if substances are not totally banned on a worldwide basis?
4/5 If you establish certain exceptions like critical usage (meaning no reasonable substitutes), how will you prevent the exceptions from swallowing up the rule? What are the incentives in terms of state behavior?
5/5 What are the realistic options concerning verification of treaty compliance, particularly when the treaty approach is not an outright ban but rather devolved plans at the national level to reduce ozone depleting substances? Will private parties acquiesce in such a ban, or is smuggling the evidence that they will not? The 2015 Paris Agreement under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change provides for devolved national plans to address climate change, so what would you expect as a result? Is it more or less helpful to have non-binding (political) environmental agreements at a certain stage, and does it matter then whether constraints on the parties are loose in terms of them entering into the agreements? But if constraints are too loose, what is the value of the agreement?
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